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IN THE WAKE OF CATALONA: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL TO
SAFEGUARD RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS’ INTERESTS IN THEIR
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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2006, four men were indicted in connection with a $4.6
million dollar body-snatching scheme.   While working for Biomedical Tissue1
Services Limited, the men allegedly paid funeral homes $1,000 per body from
which they mined tissues, organs, and bones without the consent of the
deceased’s families.   They then sold the parts for research, medical education,2
and transplantation.   Once harvested for valuable parts, the corpses were3
either cremated or stuffed with “PVC plumbing pipe in place of the bones”
and sewed back up for a funeral.4
Although an exceptionally gruesome analogy, the Biomedical Tissue
Services scandal somewhat parallels how “elite universities . . . [and]
prominent pharmaceutical companies”  have abused the rights of living5
persons with respect to their human biological materials.  Such abuse has
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6. See generally Michelle Oberman, When the Truth is Not Enough: Tissue Donation, Altruism,
and the Market, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 907 (2006) (arguing that families should be compensated for
providing access to human tissue of deceased family members); Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An
Examination of Property Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995) (discussing
whether property law should govern distribution of and control over human biological materials); William
Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human
Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 696 (1995) (recommending that courts place body parts under
property law).
7. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
8. Boulier, supra note 6, at 694-95.
9. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 72 (1987), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ota/Ota_3/DATA/1987/8719.PDF [hereinafter OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS REPORT].
10. Id.  Courts actually first granted the next of kin an enforceable right to possession of a body for
burial during the nineteenth century.  Id.  The law governing human corpses began nearly 1,000 years ago
in English ecclesiastical courts, which had “complete jurisdiction over all matters concerning burials and
disposition of corpses.”  Id.  Only in the nineteenth century was this dominion challenged by “the growth
of medical schools and their need for cadavers.”  Id. 
11. Id. at 75.
12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a), 8A U.L.A. 53 (amended 2006).  Donations can be made
by will, by a gift document (such as a donor card), or through the deceased’s next of kin.  Id. §§ 5(b), 9.
13. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS REPORT, supra note 9, at 75.  Inter vivos donations
prompted exploration for a new legal framework to govern human biological
materials.  One proposed framework would grant people a property interest in
their biological materials.6
“The ramifications of recognizing and enforcing a property interest in
body tissues are not known, but are greatly feared . . . .”   Historically, both7
courts and legislatures have resisted acknowledging property rights in the
human body and its constituent parts.   Since Colonial America, the common8
law governed the disposition of human corpses.  Not until the twentieth
century did American courts grant the deceased’s next of kin a quasi-property
right in the deceased’s body.   These rights include: “the right to possession9
and custody of the body for burial, the right to have it remain in its final
resting place, and the right to recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or
injury to the body.”10
During the mid-twentieth century, as biomedical technology
advancements created demand for transplantable tissue, the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was drafted and adopted throughout the United
States.   The Act authorizes competent adults to gift all or any part of their11
bodies upon death for medical research, education, or transplantation.12
However, it fails to address both inter vivos donations and sales of all or any
part of the body.13
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are donations made during the donor’s lifetime.  Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274g
(2000)).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2000).
16. Judith B. Prowda, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California: An Ethical Debate on
Informed Consent and Property Rights in a Patient’s Cells, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 625
(1995) (citation omitted); see also WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, ¶ A-8, at 2 (2000) (recognizing
vulnerability of “economically and medically disadvantaged” and their need for special protection)
[hereinafter DECLARATION OF HELSINKI].
17. OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS REPORT, supra note 9, at 76.
18. Boulier, supra note 6, at 695.
19. Prowda, supra note 16, at 629; see also infra Part I.
In 1984, Congress established the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA),  the current version of which prohibits the sale of “the human14
(including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea,
eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ . . .
specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.”15
“The social policy behind this law is ‘ethical and humane,’ and designed so
that scientific research would not be pursued a[t] the physical cost of the
economically and socially deprived.”   However, the law does not apply to16
human tissue and cell sales for non-transplantation purposes, such as
research.17
As illustrated above, “the law is often slow to come to grips with
technology, especially when technology advances so quickly.”   Currently,18
research participants lack property rights in their excised biological
materials.   Accordingly, this Note explores whether any context exists in19
which research participants should retain limited property rights in such
materials.  Part I examines the current legal framework governing the rights
of research participants, with special attention to informed consent and
property laws.  Part II then explores important policy considerations
implicated in discerning whether research participants should retain limited
property rights.  Next, Part III recommends that a property law concept,
traditionally used in the real property donation context, be used to secure
research participants appropriate rights based on significant policy
considerations.  Finally, Part IV briefly summarizes the points addressed in
this Note.
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20. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
21. Id. at 493.
22. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
23. Id. at 1074.
24. 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
25. For purposes of this Note, clinical patients and research volunteers are collectively referred to
as “research participants.”
26. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
27. Hairy cell leukemia is a rare cancer of the blood and bone marrow in which the bone marrow
produces excessive lymphocytes (a type of white blood cell) which may cause the spleen to swell.  U.S.
National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute, General Information About Hairy Cell Leukemia,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/treatment/hairy-cell-leukemia (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).  The
disease is called “hairy cell leukemia” because the cells look “hairy” when viewed under a microscope.  Id.
28. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
29. Id.  For these tests Dr. Golde withdrew blood and bone marrow from Moore.  Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Three landmark cases govern research participants’ rights with respect to
their human biological materials.  This section explores all three cases in
terms of both informed consent and property laws.  The first case, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California,  established that a clinical patient20
lacks property rights in biological materials excised during the patient’s
diagnosis or treatment.   Following Moore, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s21
Hospital Research Institute, Inc.,  held that a research volunteer lacks22
property rights in biological materials donated to medical research.   Most23
recently, Washington University v. Catalona  determined that both clinical24
patients and research volunteers  who donate biological materials for medical25
research do not retain ownership rights allowing them to direct the use and
transfer of the materials.26
A.  Moore v. Regents of the University of California
In Moore, after the plaintiff, John Moore, was diagnosed with hairy cell
leukemia,  he went to the UCLA Medical Center for a second opinion.27 28
Once there, Dr. David Golde performed extensive tests on Moore during
which he extracted Moore’s biological materials.   As a result, Dr. Golde both29
confirmed Moore’s diagnosis and discovered that his biological materials
were extremely valuable.   In fact, Dr. Golde knew access to such materials30
would provide him with great “competitive, commercial, and scientific
advantages.”31
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32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.  Dr. Golde informed Moore that such visits were essential to his health.  Id.  The biological
materials withdrawn on these later visits included blood, skin, bone marrow, and sperm.  Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 482.
39. The court used “lack of informed consent” and “breach of fiduciary duty” interchangeably.  Id.
at 485.
40. Id. at 482 n.4.
41. Id. at 485.
42. Id. (footnote omitted).
Once finished with the tests, Dr. Golde recommended Moore have his
spleen removed.   After Moore consented to the removal, Dr. Golde arranged32
to conduct purely scientific research on Moore’s spleen following the
operation.   This research was unrelated to Moore’s care.   Dr. Golde,33 34
however, did not inform Moore of his intentions.35
Upon Dr. Golde’s instruction, Moore returned to the UCLA Medical
Center several times for post-operative care, during which Dr. Golde withdrew
additional biological materials from Moore.   Again, without Moore’s36
consent, Dr. Golde conducted purely scientific research on Moore’s biological
materials unrelated to his care.   From Moore’s biological materials,37
Dr. Golde eventually created a cell line on which the Regents obtained a
patent worth an estimated $3.01 billion dollars.   Once Moore discovered the38
patent, he brought suit for lack of informed consent  and conversion.39 40
1.  Lack of Informed Consent
The California Supreme Court first determined that Moore had a cause
of action for lack of informed consent.   Specifically, the court held “a41
physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent,
disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research
or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”42
2.  Conversion
The court, however, held that Moore lacked a cause of action for
conversion because he did not retain an ownership interest in his excised
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43. Id. at 489.
44. Id.
45. Id.  For example, California law regulated the “procurement, processing, and distribution of
human blood.”  Id. at 489 n.23 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1601 (West 1990) (repealed 1991)).
Also, state law dictated that a dead human fetus of less than twenty weeks uterogestation be disposed of by
either burial or incineration.  Id. at 489 n.24 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.3 (West 2007)).
In addition, state law allowed the coroner to remove corneal eye tissue from a body for scientific, transplant,
or therapeutic purposes under certain circumstances.  Id. at 489 n.26 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27491.47
(West 2007)).
46. Id. at 492.
47. Id. at 493.
48. Id.  Specifically, patient rights to autonomy and privacy were adequately protected by physician
disclosure obligations such that the court need not risk chilling scientific investment, research, and
development with the threat of conversion liability.  Id. at 494.
49. Id. at 493.
50. Id.  In his dissent, Justice Mosk illustrated three major flaws in the majority’s analysis.  First,
the issue of whether a patient retains an ownership interest in his excised biological materials was an issue
of first impression to the California Supreme Court.  Id. at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).  As such, the absence
of other court decisions granting a patient such an interest was irrelevant.  Id.  Second, property rights are
sometimes described as sticks in a bundle of rights—with different sticks comprising different forms of
property.  Id. at 509.  One such stick is the right to transfer.  Id.  Although California state law heavily
regulated the disposition of excised human biological materials, the law granted patients the right to transfer
such materials through donation, thereby implying that the patients had a limited property interest in such
materials.  Id. at 518 n.23.  Lastly, the lack of informed consent remedy grants patients merely illusory
protection of their biological materials.  Id. at 519-20; see infra Part II.B.
biological materials.   The court gave three reasons for its holding.  First, no43
court to date had granted a patient an ownership interest in such materials.44
Second, California state law heavily regulated the disposition of human
biological materials, drastically limiting a patient’s interest in them.   Lastly,45
because the patented cell line was “both factually and legally distinct” from
Moore’s biological materials, he lacked a property interest in the cell line and
its derivative products.46
Next, the court declined to extend conversion law to cover the use of
human biological materials in medical research for three reasons.   First, a47
balancing of the prevailing policy considerations counseled against
extension.   Second, the legislature was the better forum to decide whether48
to extend conversion liability.   And lastly, the court lacked a pressing need49
to extend conversion law because of the lack of an informed consent remedy.50
2008] IN THE WAKE OF CATALONA 775
51. Canavan disease is a rare but fatal genetic brain disorder most frequently afflicting Ashkenazi
Jewish children.  Canavan Foundation, What Is Canavan Disease?, http://www.canavanfoundation.org/
canavan.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).  Symptoms include “rapidly increasing head circumference, lack
of head control, reduced visual responsiveness and abnormal muscle tone such as stiffness or floppiness.”
Id.  Afflicted children “cannot crawl, walk, sit or talk.”  Id.  Moreover, “they may suffer seizures, become
paralyzed, mentally retarded or blind and have trouble swallowing. . . .  Most children do not live past age
10.”  Id.  The Canavan Foundation was a non-profit organization plaintiff in Greenberg.  Greenberg v.
Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
52. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
53. Id. at 1066-67.
54. Id. at 1067.
55. Id.  Such materials included blood, urine, and autopsy samples.  Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.  Dr. Matalon was an employee of the Miami Children’s Hospital.  Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
B.  Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute
In Greenberg, the parents of children afflicted with Canavan disease51
requested that a physician-researcher, Dr. Reuben Matalon, attempt to isolate
the disease-causing gene.   From this research, the parents anticipated the52
development and distribution of prenatal and carrier tests for Canavan disease
on an affordable, accessible basis, as well as the discovery of more effective
prevention techniques and, eventually, a cure for the disease.   Consequently,53
they also expected Dr. Matalon’s research would remain in the public
domain.54
To assist Dr. Matalon in his research, the parents, along with several non-
profit organizations, located other children afflicted with the disease to collect
human biological materials.   They then created a confidential database55
containing epidemiological, medical, and other information about the affected
children and their families.   With the funding, biological materials, and56
information provided by both the parents and non-profit organizations,
Dr. Matalon successfully identified the Canavan disease gene.   Shortly57
thereafter, without informing the parents or non-profit organizations, the
Miami Children’s Hospital patented the isolated genetic sequence.   Under58
the patent, the hospital restricted access to all Canavan disease gene-related
activity including “carrier and prenatal testing, gene therapy and other
treatments . . . and research involving the gene and its mutations.”   The59
hospital then created restrictive licensing agreements limiting the availability
of Canavan disease testing and accessibility of the identified gene for
research.60
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61. Id. at 1071.
62. Id. at 1070.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1070-71.
65. Id. at 1071.
66. Id.  The court’s analysis contained certain weaknesses.  First, although the court feared medical
research would be chilled by requiring researchers to disclose economic interests, it ignored that
Dr. Matalon and the hospital had already chilled medical research when they patented Dr. Matalon’s
research, thereby removing it from the public domain.  Also, the court completely disregarded the American
Medical Association’s Code of Ethics, Professional Guidelines for Physician-Researchers, which required
physician-researchers to disclose potential commercial applications to research volunteers and obtain their
informed consent before realizing a profit on products developed from their biological materials.  Id. at
1071 n.2 (citing Am. Med. Ass’n Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Op. on Soc. Policy Issues E.208
(1990)).
67. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
68. Id.  However, the parents and non-profit organizations did have certain expectations of return
from their donation, such as public access to Dr. Matalon’s research, affordable testing, more effective
prevention techniques, and possibly a cure to Canavan disease.  Id. at 1066-67.
1.  Lack of Informed Consent
The district court held that the parents and non-profit organizations failed
to state a cause of action for lack of informed consent.   While the court61
acknowledged that a medical researcher owes research volunteers a limited
duty of informed consent, it refused to require a researcher to disclose
economic interests for four reasons.  First, such a requirement would give
donors complete dominion over the purposes and beneficiaries of medical
research.   Second, such a requirement would be unworkable.   Third, it62 63
would cause researchers to constantly evaluate whether a discloseable event
occurred, thereby chilling medical research.   Lastly, as the parents64
voluntarily donated their children’s biological materials to medical research,
they are not similarly situated to a patient whose biological materials are
obtained for medical research on account of diagnosis and treatment.   As65
such, the court determined that they should receive different treatment.66
2.  Conversion
The district court next determined that the parents and non-profit
organizations lacked a cause of action for conversion.   Specifically, the67
plaintiffs did not retain an ownership interest in the children’s excised
biological materials because the materials were voluntarily donated without
a contemporaneous expectation of return.   In addition, the court found that68
2008] IN THE WAKE OF CATALONA 777
69. Id. at 1075-76.
70. Id. at 1076.
71. Biological materials included prostate tissue, blood, and DNA samples.  Wash. Univ. v.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 988 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007).
72. Id.  Dr. Catalona specialized in prostate cancer research.  Id.
73. Id. at 990.
74. Id.
75. Id.  Nevertheless, the research participants could not have the results obtained from their
materials prior to withdrawal destroyed or recalled.  Id.
76. Id. at 985. The GU Biorepository housed human biological materials donated by WU physicians’
research participants for prostate cancer research.  Id. at 988 & n.3.
77. Id. at 989.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 993.
the conversion claim, which alleged the commercialization of Dr. Matalon’s
research exceeded the authorized use of the human biological materials, was
too attenuated.   Specifically, the court thought that such an expansive theory69
would cripple medical research by granting donors a continuing right to
possess the results of any research conducted by the donee.70
C.  Washington University v. Catalona
In Catalona, research participants donated biological materials  to, and71
at the direction of, Dr. William Catalona, a researcher, urologist, and urologic
surgeon at Washington University (WU).   Prior to donation, the research72
participants completed an informed-consent form and signed a WU Genetic
Research Brochure.   Neither document indicated whether the research73
participants could have their materials sent to another research institution.74
However, the brochure did allow the participants to withdraw their materials
and have them destroyed.75
The donated materials were stored in WU’s Genito-Urinary (GU)
Biorepository.   Thus, if physician-researchers outside of WU desired access76
to the materials, they first had to complete a Material Transfer Agreement
indicating that WU owned such materials.   Additionally, WU’s Intellectual77
Property Policy specified that WU owned all intellectual property, including
tangible research property created with “significant [u]niversity resources” or
“pursuant to a research project funded through corporate, federal, or other
external sponsors administered by the [u]niversity.”78
Eventually, Dr. Catalona transferred from WU to a position at
Northwestern University.   Before his departure, however, he mailed his79
current and former research participants a letter requesting they release to him
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80. Id.  The letter included a “Medical Consent & Authorization” form that Dr. Catalona directed
the research participants to complete and return to him.  Id.  The form stated:
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sample for Dr. William J. Catalona’s research studies.
Please release all of my samples to Dr. Catalona at Northwestern University upon his request.
I have entrusted these samples to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his direction and with his
express consent for research projects.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 997.
83. Id. at 1002.
84. Id. at 997.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 997, 999.
87. Id. at 999.
88. Id. at 1000.
89. Id. at 998.
any biological materials they contributed to the GU Biorepository.80
Approximately 6,000 research participants released their materials to
Dr. Catalona.81
The district court determined that the research participants “parted with
any semblance of ownership rights once their biological materials [were] . . .
excised for medical research”  and that WU owned all biological materials82
in the GU Biorepository.   Specifically, the court held that the research83
participants made an inter vivos gift of the subject biological materials to
WU.   The court defined an inter vivos gift as requiring: “(1) [the] present84
intention of the donor to make a gift; (2) delivery of property by donor to
donee; and (3) acceptance by donee whose ownership takes effect
immediately and absolutely.”85
In concluding that the research participants had the present intention to
make a gift, the court relied upon the informed consent forms that repeatedly
asserted WU’s ownership of the donated materials and did not advise the
research participants that they entrusted their materials to Dr. Catalona.86
Nevertheless, Dr. Catalona and the research participants argued that the
research participants’ right to withdraw from a research protocol included the
right to control “the use and location of their excised biological materials.”87
However, the court held that the right to withdraw only meant that the
research participants had chosen to cease providing biological materials
pursuant to a research protocol.   The court based its holding upon two88
separate grounds.  First, governing federal regulations did not provide the
right asserted by Dr. Catalona and the research participants.   Second, WU89
policy clearly indicated that once research participants discontinued their
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90. Id. at 999.  Of note, Dr. Catalona and the research participants also argued that the research
participants made a bailment of their biological materials to WU, designating WU as the bailee.  Id. at
1001.  However, the court rejected this argument, as it was inconsistent with the court’s previous ruling that
the research participants had made an inter vivos gift of the materials to WU.  Id.  Also significant were the
facts that the research participants failed to inform WU that they wanted their materials returned when they
“delivered” them to WU, federal and state regulations prohibited possession of such materials by the
research participants, and the medical research community did not consider the relationship between a
medical research institution and research participants to be a bailment.  Id.
91. Id. at 1002.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.  Specifically, the court stated:
Allowing [research participants] to choose who can have the sample, where the sample will be
stored, and/or how the sample can be used is tantamount to a blood donor being able to dictate
that his/her blood can only be transfused into a person of a certain ethnic background, or a
donated kidney being transplanted only into a woman or man.
Id.
participation in a research protocol, WU handled the participants’ biological
materials in one of three ways: destroying the materials, storing them
indefinitely without further use, or removing all identifying markers and using
the materials in exempt “anonymized” research.90
Next, the court discussed certain policy implications concerning the
argument of Dr. Catalona and the research participants.  First, the court feared
that granting the research participants ownership rights in the use and location
of their biological materials would create a market for the materials such that
the materials would become chattels selling for the highest price.   Moreover,91
granting such rights would thwart medical research as such materials would
be distributed to the highest bidder rather than the most important research
protocol.   Also, “[t]he integrity and utility of all biorepositories would be92
seriously threatened” because “individual samples would come and go” such
that research protocols could no longer rely upon aggregate collections.93
Thus, “[these] institutions would [become mere] warehouses filling purchase
orders.”   Finally, in granting such rights, prejudicial influences could enter94
medical research.95
II.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Several important policies must be considered in determining whether
research participants who donate biological materials for medical research
should retain limited property rights in such materials.  In making this
determination, the interests of the research participants must be balanced
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96. Prowda, supra note 16, at 638-39.
97. DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, supra note 16, ¶ A-5.
98. Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating
Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 82 (2002).
99. Id.; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485-86 (Cal. 1990).
100. Harrison, supra note 98, at 83.
101. Prowda, supra note 16, at 636.
102. Id. (footnote omitted).
103. Boulier, supra note 6, at 716.
104. Id. (footnote omitted).
against society’s interest in the free progression of medical research.96
Nevertheless, “considerations related to the well-being of the [research
participants] should take precedence over the interests of science and
society.”   Research participants have three primary interests in favor of97
property rights in their biological material: (1) dignity, (2) autonomy, and
(3) economic profitability.  Each interest implicates important concerns for
which any ownership regime must adequately account.
A.  Research Participants’ Interest in Dignity
A research participant’s interest in dignity is comprised of three important
notions.  First, an unequal amount of information exists between research
participants and physician-researchers.   Specifically, while physician-98
researchers may know that a research participant’s biological materials are
extremely valuable, the research participant himself may be totally unaware
of this possibility.   Moreover, because research participants generally do not99
seek legal relief after their biological materials have been used for profit, a
coherent and predictable policy governing the collection, distribution, and use
of such materials does not exist.   As such, to restore research participants’100
dignity, the disparity of information between themselves and physician-
researchers must be equalized.   Thus, research participants should know101
“the nature of the intended research, what the research hopes to accomplish
and who will benefit medically and monetarily.”102
The second component of a research participant’s dignity interest is the
sanctity of the human body.   Theoretically, “nothing is more one’s own than103
one’s body.”   Conceivably, the belief that research participants should have104
unlimited ownership rights in their biological materials logically flows.
However, unlimited rights may instead demean the sanctity of the human body
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105. Id. at 717.
106. Gold, supra note 6, at 1171 (footnote omitted).
107. Boulier, supra note 6, at 718.
108. Id. at 719.
109. Id.
110. Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical
Research: Why a Source Shouldn’t Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 638-39 (1989).
111. Hannah Horsley, Reconsidering Inalienability for Commercially Valuable Biological Materials,
29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223, 237 (1992).  For example, informed consent laws, privacy rights, and research
subject protection laws.  Id.
because of special considerations associated with it and its constituent parts.105
Specifically, as one commentator explained:
[Property law] treat[s] goods considered “property” primarily as market goods. . . .
[M]arket goods are optimally distributed through the auspices of the market which
takes into account all the values and disvalues pertaining to a good and allocates the
good in such a manner as to maximize overall value.  The human body and its
component parts are not, however, market goods.  This is so because many modes
of valuing the body cannot be translated into or understood in terms of a market
price.106
Nevertheless, consistent with the progression of technology, society has
allowed “the body to be used in various ways that would have once been
unacceptable under an older conception of the body.”   For example,107
commercial interests in the human body are rapidly growing.   In the wake108
of such societal changes, limited ownership rights in human biological
materials may protect the dignity of the human body because such rights
would grant research participants an “enforceable stake” in their biological
materials, allowing them to control such materials even upon removal.109
The final notion included in a research participant’s dignity interest is
altruism.  Among other motivations, research participants donate their
biological materials as a public charity.   To effectuate the participants’110
donative intent, research institutions and physician-researchers must be
limited to prevent them from exploiting research-participant altruism.  Such
boundaries may be set by allowing research participants a limited ownership
right in their biological materials.
B.  Research Participants’ Interest in Autonomy
A research participant also has a significant interest in autonomy.  Both
judicial decisions and legislation establish that individuals have the right to
make decisions regarding their bodies.   In the context of human biological111
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materials, however, informed consent laws are the most relevant.
Unfortunately, such laws do not adequately protect research participants’
autonomy interests.
Specifically, in Moore, Justice Mosk explained how informed-consent
laws grant research participants only illusory protection of their biological
materials.   Specifically, patients claiming a lack of informed consent must112
prove that: (1) had they been informed of the undisclosed information they
would not have consented to the procedure in question; and, (2) in the same
situation a reasonably prudent person would not have consented either.113
However, in cases like Moore, the potential treatment benefit—a life-saving
operation—generally outweighs the undisclosed risk of the physician using
the biological materials for research or commercial product development.114
Therefore, a trier of fact will most likely conclude that a reasonably prudent
person would have consented to the procedure in question.115
Moreover, Greenberg determined that a physician-researcher owes no
continuing duty of informed consent to research volunteers who lack a
“clinical relationship” with the physician-researcher.   Thus, a physician-116
researcher need not “disclose any information that might influence [the
research participants’] decision to participate or decline to participate” in the
research.117
In both situations informed consent laws did not protect research
participants’ autonomy interest.  Instead, the participants were stripped of
their right to make decisions regarding their own bodies.  In light of these
offensive outcomes, if research participants are not granted limited property
rights in their biological materials, they may refuse to donate such materials,
thereby chilling medical research.   Without such rights, participant118
autonomy is undermined and physician-researchers, research institutions, and
biotechnology companies gain “unchecked authority to involve [participants]
in research and development.”119
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C.  Research Participants’ Economic Interest
Lastly, research participants have an economic interest in their biological
materials.  As previously mentioned, research participants provide the raw
materials of medical research without compensation.  In return for their
contribution, they typically expect broad access to affordable products such
as medication, therapy, and testing.   However, such expectations are120
generally not realized.
Granting research participants limited property rights in their biological
materials may promote a redistribution of wealth among research participants,
physician-researchers, research institutions, and biotechnology companies.
Currently, the number of patents in the biotechnology industry is ever-
increasing and “secrecy is fast becoming the norm.”   Additionally, patents121
and secrecy also serve to increase end-user health care costs.  Granting
research participants limited property rights would allow them greater control
over the distribution of their biological materials and permit them to choose
physician-researchers less likely to commercialize the fruits of their medical
research.
III.  RECOMMENDATION
“[P]roperty [law] is an abstraction.  It refers not to things, . . . but to rights
or relationships among people with respect to things.”   Thus, in its purest122
form, property law assigns individuals legal rights to things of value in our
society.  For many years, however, the human body and its constituent parts
were considered “worthless.”   As such, the only property rights that existed123
were related to the disposition of corpses.   However, as biotechnology124
evolved, the value of the human body similarly appreciated.   In particular,125
human biological materials became extremely important to medical
research.   Now, these once useless materials constitute the raw materials126
used to create “life saving medicines and therapies” and have become a
“billion dollar industry.”127
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The concept of “[property] consists of a number of disparate rights, a
‘bundle’ of them: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude,
[and] the right to transfer.”   However, all forms of property do not possess128
the same bundle of rights.   Instead, the law “limits or even forbids the129
exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property.”   Thus, while such130
limitations or prohibitions may “diminish[] the bundle of rights that would
otherwise attach to the property, . . . what remains is still deemed in law to be
a protectible property interest.”   Furthermore, although society attaches131
different values to each disparate property right, “[rights] traditionally
associated with personal liberties such as [privacy (the right to exclude) and
freedom of choice and movement (the right to transfer)] receive[] greater
protection from governmental encroachment.”132
All persons possess certain constitutional rights “which can never be
suppressed without challenging the person’s very dignity and existence.”133
These rights include “the right to due process, the right to own property, the
right to bodily integrity, the right to live, and the right not to be owned.”134
Accordingly, all persons possess a constitutional right in their own bodies.135
As the courts in Moore, Greenburg, and Catalona held, however, their rights
with respect to donated biological materials may be more limited.   In136
particular, they generally do not retain any property interest in such
materials.   Research participants who donate human biological materials for137
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medical research should, however, retain limited rights to exclude and transfer
with respect to their materials.138
A.  The Fee Simple Defeasible
To accomplish this objective, the legislature could grant research
participants the right to create a fee simple defeasible in their excised
biological materials and mandate health care providers to inform participants
of this right as part of informed consent.  Currently, fee simple defeasibles are
used in conjunction with real property donations.   A fee simple defeasible139
ownership interest may endure forever or may cease upon the occurrence of
a future event.   In addition, two types of fee simple defeasibles exist: the140
“fee simple determinable” and the “fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent.”   However, the fee simple determinable is more amenable to the141
context of human biological materials.
A fee simple determinable ownership interest is extremely limited.142
Specifically, the interest automatically expires when a stated event
transpires.   Also, to create such an interest the donor must use specific143
language indicating the durational aspect of the interest; language merely
stating the donor’s motive for making the gift is not enough.144
Through a fee simple determinable, research participants could donate
their biological materials to a research institution so long as a certain
physician-researcher receives them.  This protects research participants’
interests in privacy and autonomy.  For example, if a research participant’s
trusted physician removes a cancerous tumor from the participant, the
participant could designate the tumor to be used only in that particular
physician’s research.  In addition, this approach encourages the free exchange
of information.  For example, a research participant could specifically
designate a physician-researcher that the participant believes will leave any
information discovered in the public domain.  Additionally, once the
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physician-researcher receives such materials, the research participant could no
longer control its use or transfer.  This ensures the unhindered progression of
medical research by limiting the control research participants have over their
biological materials.
B.  Creation of the Fee Simple Determinable
Although property law is derived from the common law, “the [l]egislature
. . . is [clearly] the proper deliberative forum” to grant research participants
the power to create a fee simple defeasible in their biological materials.145
Current state and federal laws view such materials as sui generis, “regulating
their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the
general law of personal property.”   Accordingly, the legislature has the146
proper resources to determine whether to extend the fee simple defeasible to
human biological materials.
More specifically, because this issue requires a uniform solution,
Congress is the appropriate legislature to grant research participants such
rights.  Although the states generally regulate both property law and the
disposal of human biological materials, Congress has enacted comprehensive
legislation regarding such materials, thereby demonstrating its competency in
the area.   Unfortunately, Congress also has demonstrated susceptibility to147
powerful interest groups.  For example, former Vice President Al Gore
described the Medicare prescription drug benefit as “a token plan designed to
trick the voters and satisfy pharmaceutical companies.”   Specifically,148
Congress restricted the federal government from negotiating Medicare drug
prices even though the government already negotiates drug prices for both
Medicaid and the Veteran’s Administration.   This created higher drug costs149
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for Medicare beneficiaries and greater profits for pharmaceutical
companies.150
With respect to human biological materials, both biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies are entrepreneurial profit-seeking entities.  Because
they use such materials in extremely expensive, high risk research projects,
they traditionally desire unconditional title to the materials.  As a result, they
will most likely oppose granting research participants the right to create a fee
simple defeasible and its associated conditions in such materials.
Consequently, they may exert political pressure on Congress to impede the
passage of legislation expanding the rights of research participants in their
biological materials.
C.  Enforcement of the Fee Simple Determinable
A fee simple determinable ownership interest is accompanied by a future
interest—either a possibility of reverter or an executory interest.   While a151
possibility of reverter is retained by the donor, an executory interest is created
in another donee.   In addition, if the fee simple determinable interest holder152
violates its stated condition, the interest passes to the future interest holder by
operation of law.153
As state laws prohibit persons from possessing their excised biological
materials, a possibility of reverter could not be used in conjunction with such
materials.   However, an executory interest could designate a contingent154
physician-researcher recipient should the primary recipient fail to receive the
donated biological materials.  In addition, if the research institution does not
distribute the materials in accordance with the fee simple determinable
condition, the research participant could have an equitable cause of action for
injunctive relief ordering that the materials either be placed with the
designated physician-researcher or destroyed.  A downside to judicial
intervention, however, is that the process is both slow and can be very costly.
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This may have a detrimental effect on donated material with a limited useful
life.
IV.  CONCLUSION
A commentator once noted that although “the law marches with
medicine,” it does so “in the rear and limping a little.”   Indeed, as new uses155
for the human body and its component parts have evolved, so too has the
body’s value appreciated.  Laws governing the body’s disposition, however,
have not kept pace with this trend.  In particular, laws dictating research
participants’ rights with respect to their biological materials have failed to
adequately protect important participant interests, including dignity,
autonomy, and economic concerns.
As illustrated through Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona, research
participants do not retain an ownership interest in their excised biological
materials.  However, research participants may nevertheless be able to donate
such materials pursuant to the laws of certain states.  Unfortunately, under the
current legal framework, participants’ altruistic donations are likely to be
abused.  For example, physician-researchers may fail to disclose either the
value of a participant’s biological materials or patent information to create
higher end-user product costs.  Undoubtedly, research participants need
greater control over their biological materials to prevent such abuse—control
which should properly flow from Congress.
Specifically, research participants who donate biological materials for
medical research should retain limited rights to exclude and transfer with
respect to their materials.  This can be achieved by granting participants the
right to create a fee simple determinable in such materials.  A fee simple
determinable will appropriately balance significant policy considerations to
ensure the free progression of medical research is consonant with the
protection of important research-participant interests.  The current absence of
donor rights demands that action be taken to prevent future abuse.
